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RESPONSE AND RESPONSIBILITY
Richard Mohr
Indigenous Law Bulletin (2009) 7, 15-18.
[F]orcible removal was an act of genocide contrary to the Convention on
Genocide ratified by Australia in 1949 [which] specifically includes ‘forcibly
transferring children of [a] group to another group’ with the intention of destroying
the group.1

In support of his motion of apology to the Stolen Generations on 13 February
2008 (‘the Apology’), Prime Minister Rudd used the word ‘responsibility’ four
times. He explicitly mentioned intergenerational, mutual and national
responsibility. The word was used once in the motion itself, calling for ‘mutual
responsibility’. The key theme of the Apology was that ‘we, the parliaments of the
nation, are ultimately responsible’ for the suffering inflicted by the laws and
policies of child removal.2 The Coalition’s position on responsibility was stated
with more candour by Senator Concetta Fieravanti-Wells, who abstained from
the vote, than by the leader of the opposition. Her concern was that ‘this and
future generations will be made financially responsible for past and potentially
current actions towards Indigenous Australia’.3
A year after the Apology, I would like to analyse certain statements and actions
since the opening of the current Federal Parliament on 12 February 2008 that
illuminate the notion of responsibility for suffering that is legally inflicted on
others. In particular, I would like to consider the extent to which laws passed by
parliaments absolve individual members of a community from responsibility. I will
consider ‘responsibility’ as a term that potentially carries with it some implications
for both current and future action. That is, even if it were possible to frame an
apology within such a limited framework that it would only refer to past actions
and events, surely the notion of responsibility requires that we consider a
response, that is to say, how we are to act in the future.
I have chosen to begin my analysis on the day the new Parliament opened,
which was the day before the Apology speech, because that brings into focus
that day’s events outside of Parliament, where thousands of people rallied to
oppose the Northern Territory Emergency Response ('NTER’). Mr Rudd was not
among the politicians who addressed that rally; his speech the following day, and
the reactions to it, was notably silent on the question of continuing responsibility
for the NTER. Senator Fieravanti-Wells, in responding to the Apology, did
address the issue of ongoing responsibility ‘for past and current actions’, even
though her primary concern was to avoid it. It seems that her reference to
‘current actions’ was an indirect reference to the subject of those protests: the
massive police and military operation the previous Government had mounted in
the Northern Territory.
The Intervention introduced a series of measures in an atmosphere of moral

panic in response to the Little Children are Sacred Report (‘the Report’), which
detailed child abuse within Northern Territory Aboriginal communities. The
measures included making benefits payments conditional on school attendance,
medical examination of all Indigenous children in the Territory and compulsory
acquisition of lands held by Indigenous communities under native title. The
authors of the Report stated in August 2007 that the Intervention ‘does not
include acting on any of 97 recommendations they made after a nine-month
inquiry into the sexual abuse of Indigenous children’. They were ‘devastated’ to
see ‘the troops roll into the Northern Territory’.4
The further use of military force to combat child abuse, and a return to the
paternalistic policies of the past, indicates that the policies of forced assimilation,
dispossession and racial discrimination have returned to Australia. So concerned
was the previous Government that the Intervention may be found to be racially
discriminatory that it was exempted from the provisions of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’). It is likely that collective punishment of
people of a particular race would be found to discriminate on the grounds of
race.5 Military and para-military responses to allegations of child abuse run
dangerously close to reviving previous forcible removal policies.
What is notable is that the Labor Party, initially critical of the Intervention,
ultimately supported it in all legislative points. More than a year into the new
Government’s parliamentary term, it is notable that it has not modified that policy
or amended that legislation, despite an earlier commitment to bring it within the
purview of the RDA. Larissa Behrendt has criticised the Intervention, and asked,
a year ago, what the Government was going to do after the Apology.6 I would like
to propose in this analysis that apologising without addressing any of the
concerns over the Intervention shows not only a lack of commitment or follow
through, but also betrays some a dangerous lack of attention to the very
concerns that led to the Apology in the first place.

Responsibility
Before considering the way in which Mr Rudd dealt with issues of responsibility, I
will briefly consider some theoretical issues surrounding law and responsibility. A
traditional view sees law as a technique for attaching responsibility. Scott Veitch
follows Nicola Lacey in proposing an alternative view of law as a technology of
social organisation. That is, Veitch considers that law disperses responsibilities to
such an extent that it becomes a technology for ‘the legitimation of human
suffering’. Law’s ‘technologies of responsibility’, working within the ‘broader social
forms of power, also provide some of the major resources through which
dispersals and disavowals of responsibility in society can occur’. The contrast
between the isolated post-Enlightenment individual and the dominance of social
institutions produces a ‘proliferation of irresponsibilities’.7 The result is ‘the
irresponsible mentality’, fostered in the individual who is buffetted by illusions of
choice and autonomy, but is, in reality, powerless.8

The historical dimension to this bleak critique traces changes from ancient Greek
conceptions of responsibility, through to the individualisation of the self-conscious
‘moral agent’ of the Enlightenment. Veitch transposes these into a post-modern
world that has been re-populated by ‘a plurality of social systems, and their
offerings and solutions’. So, if the ancient heroes did not know responsibility
because they were playthings of fate and the gods, we moderns fail to respond to
those now well-known responsibilities by being tossed about by social systems.
But despite the interference of fate and the gods in ancient Greek epics, their
notion of responsibility was a ‘thick’ one, imputing to the actor the consequences
of those actions, and bringing with it ‘the obligation to compensate or submit to
punishment’.9 This is in contrast to the ‘thin’, modern idea of responsibility which,
Ricoeur proposes, takes no account of the broad issues of moral responsibility,
relying instead on a narrow conception of legal responsibility. Being responsible
in a purely legal sense allows us to mitigate our culpability and offset our liability
through ‘technologies of responsibility’, among which Veitch includes consumer
economy, administrative decision making, accounting and auditing10 that have
replaced the ancient gods. This state of dispersed responsibility calls for a
reassessment of law and ethics. Can we imagine a moral actor who is selfconscious but not isolated from others?
Desmond Manderson has drawn the distinction between this thin responsibility to
a generalised other, and the relationship of proximity. He insists that law is based
in the ethical relationship, the duty of care one owes to a specific ‘other’. The
arrangements of reciprocity define the boundaries of the self and the other, so
that the individual is recognised through his or her reciprocal relations, of gift or
contract.11 Veitch’s critique of law’s role in the allocation of responsibility finds it
fundamentally compromised by a society of nominally free individuals who are
disempowered by technologies that disperse responsibilities.
Our responsibilities to others have been mediated by social relations and
collectivities. We have many of the characteristics of the Enlightenment
individual: we are self-conscious and we recognise our specificity as persons and
as legal subjects. Yet, as members of collectivities, we recognise the constraints
on our actions, that our free will is not absolute. Let us see how this interplay of
responsibility, moral consciousness and legal technologies plays out in the Rudd
Government’s apology and subsequent responses.

The Apology
The Apology expressly invokes the responsibility of parliaments to absolve any
individual of responsibility. As the Prime Minister said:
We, the parliaments of the nation, are ultimately responsible, not those
who gave effect to our laws. The problem lay with the laws themselves.

There can be no question of agency in this account: people who implemented
policies of child removal, even those ‘protectors of natives’ who stand
condemned by their genocidal statements quoted by Mr Rudd,12 were merely
‘giving effect’ to laws. There is no opening here for inquiries into individual
responsibility or culpability, of the sort that motivated South Africa’s or Canada’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.
Mr Rudd did, however, concede that there were certain relevant
‘intergenerational responsibilities’. He went on from laying the blame on the laws
to refer to the ‘many blessings [we like other settler societies have received] from
our ancestors, and therefore we must also be the bearer of their burdens as well.'
These ancestors and their euphemistically named ‘blessings’ were not so
remote. Mr Rudd pointed out that the policies of child removal continued into the
1970s, when some current members of Parliament were first elected, a period
‘well within the adult memory span of many of us’. Yet the language of
‘ancestors’ and ‘memory spans’ still manages to deflect responsibility. An ‘adult
memory span’ presumably refers to events in our adult lives, to a period in which
we were ‘responsible’ in a legal sense, in which we were electing responsible
parliamentary representatives, some of whom, as Mr Rudd points out, are still
sitting in the Parliament.
The Prime Minister referred to another sort of responsibility, that of ‘national
responsibility’, in support of his proposal to develop bi-partisan policies agreed
with the opposition. Apart from the fact that this approach was quickly rejected by
the opposition, it was hardly one likely to inspire confidence among Indigenous
communities and others concerned to pursue respectful, egalitarian policies,
given the coalition’s record on Indigenous affairs over its eleven year rule.
Particularly troubling was the Prime Minister’s choice of words for forming a bipartisan approach. We need, he said ‘a kind of war cabinet on parts of
Indigenous policy’.13 The last time the Labor Party and Coalition had joined
forces to declare war on Indigenous communities was when they sent the troops
into the Northern Territory in 2007.
In all the Prime Minister’s rhetoric about the responsibilities of parliaments, the
agency of laws (‘and not of men’, to paraphrase the rule of law doctrine14) and
the workings of time to allocate to ‘ancestors’ the ‘blessings’ we settlers have
received from dispossession of others’ land, one anecdote stands out. It is the
only point at which Mr Rudd personalised the question of responsibility, apology
and retribution. In response to his own rhetorical question, ‘Why apologise?’, Mr
Rudd took six of the total 24 paragraphs of his speech to tell the story of Nanna
Nungala Fejo, stolen from her family in about 1932.15 It is a characteristically
appalling story of broken families and inhumanity, in which the agency for ‘giving
effect to those laws’ is specifically allocated to ‘a truck, two white men and an
Aboriginal stockman on horseback cracking his stockwhip’. The Prime Minister’s
punch line should be quoted in detail:

As I left, later on, Nanna Fejo took one of my staff aside, wanting to make sure
that I was not too hard on the Aboriginal stockman who had hunted those kids
down all those years ago. The stockman had found her again decades later, this
time himself to say, “Sorry.” And remarkably, extraordinarily, she had forgiven
him.

We know nothing of what the white men were doing, though the truck
presumably did not drive itself; certainly, it is unlikely that the stockman, whip or
no whip, ‘hunted those kids down’ and put them on the truck all by himself. Mr
Rudd’s point, of course, is that, even were we to find an agent (and how
convenient that this one is Aboriginal), he can now be forgiven. Indeed, he
should be forgiven because Nanna Fejo forgave him and wanted ‘to make sure
the Prime Minister was ‘not too hard on him’. This is a parable of biblical
credentials, with sins and sinners, guilt and forgiveness, a scapegoat chosen to
bear the guilt of a whole community. With this device the whole question of
agency is dispatched, leaving the field open to parliaments, laws and other
nameless institutions to act as technologies to disperse responsibility.

Response
What, then, are we to make of an apology that pledges never to repeat past
injustices while failing to respond, to allocate responsibility, or to accept
responsibility for repetition of such a policy? What are we to make of the pride
that so many Australians felt in celebrating that apology? The distress and
outrage felt by many Australians over the previous Government’s failure to
apologise to the Stolen Generations, and the many spontaneous expressions of
apology, indicate a widespread sense of collective responsibility. We respond
when faced with the evidence of the unspeakable suffering of Indigenous people,
many of them of our own generation. We must assess the adequacy of the
response.
The impersonality of law and the overarching power of the Parliament can be
seen, as they are by Veitch, to deprive us of personal responsibility. Yet if ethical
life is to continue, we must also see ourselves as persons with responsibilities to
others. Whether we were duped by the law, the parliament, or, like the ancient
Greeks, by the gods, we must still see the consequences of our actions; ‘good
intentions’ or institutional imperatives cannot completely absolve us.
Reciprocity, as Ricoeur and Manderson point out, involves recognition of the
between: this includes the relations between connected persons, persons with a
continuity of life experience, be that of suffering and loss of family or of active
participation in removing children. Yet whether or not we individually participated
in the removal of children, or any of the earlier crimes, we are also connected as
inhabitants of the same space, a social and a physical space. To recognise that
one is the beneficiary of the alienation of another’s land, which entailed the
destruction of many cultures and the denial of their law, is to be disturbed by

profound doubts about the moral foundation of one’s own culture, law and wellbeing.
The Prime Minister’s Apology addressed only the first of the actions proposed by
the Bringing Them Home report. It is worth stressing that, beyond
acknowledgment and apology, the report also recommended ‘guarantees against
repetition, measures of restitution, measures of rehabilitation, and monetary
compensation.’16 A tort which, as Manderson notes, is at the heart of our
relationship to the other, cannot simply be swept away by the acceptance of a
generalised responsibility. That responsibility has consequences for the other,
which must include redress, allocation of responsibility, and reparations. Not only
did the Apology fail to address the question of reparations, but the Government’s
subsequent actions give no confidence that it can – or will – guarantee against
repetition of genocidal practices.
The Intervention into Aboriginal communities of the Northern Territory continues
to run that risk of repetition. It does this by overturning land rights, by collective
punishment of whole communities (exclusively Aboriginal communities) by
quarantining of income, by sending in contingents of police and soldiers to
‘combat’ child abuse. If these actions were, indeed, well intended, and were not
racially discriminatory, then at least they would have to be exposed to the test of
the RDA. That they are still screened from the operation of that Act indicates a
complete lack of responsibility taken for their impact on a race of people. On 13
October 2008, the Minister released the report of the Northern Territory
Emergency Response Review Board. While generally supporting the Intervention
as a response to a genuine ‘national emergency’, the Review recommended
improved cooperation with Indigenous communities, making the income
management scheme voluntary and that all Government actions should ‘respect
Australia’s human rights obligations and conform with the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975’.17
While apologising for, and making good on, our responsibilities for past wrongs,
we must also look forward; we must properly comprehend the risk of repeating
our genocidal past. To continue racist and potentially genocidal policies
constitutes an ethical betrayal and a refusal of responsibility. We still possess a
language of responsibility; we must use it to try to recognise how we should
respond to past injustices and respond ethically and intelligently, rather than with
blind belligerence to current and future challenges.
Richard Mohr is Senior Lecturer and Director of the Legal Intersections Research Centre, University of
Wollongong. The final version of this article was completed as a visiting researcher at the Judicial Systems
Research Institute (IRSIG-CNR), Bologna with the support of the Short Term Mobility program of the
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Italy).
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